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45TH CONGRESS, }

SENATE.

2d Session.

Ex. Doc.
{ No. 87.

LETTER
FROM THE

SECRETARY OF T·HE INTERIOR,
TRANSMITTING,

In compliance witlt a Senate resolutton of Ma.lf 24, 1878, a copy of tlw
memorial of B. F. Overton, governor of the Chickasaw Nation, praying
for a rehearing in the matter of the Chickasaw Nation permit law.

MAY

28, 1878.-0rdered to lie on the table and be printed.

DEP.A.RTMENT OF ~'HE INTERIOR,

Washington, D. C., May 27, 1878.
have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of a resolution of
the Senate of the United States adopted on the 24th instant, as follows:
SIR: I

Resolved, That the Secretary of the Interior be, and he is hereby, directed to furnish the Senate with a copy of the memorial of B. F. Overton, governor of the Chickasaw Nation, praying for a rehearing in the matter of the Chickasaw Nation permit
law, and not embraced in the Senate Ex. Doc. No. 74, in ·response to resolution of the
17th ultimo.

And in accordance with the direction therein contained, a copy of. the
printed memorial is ,herewith respectfully transmitted.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
C. SCHURZ,
Secretary.
The PRESIDENT OF THE SENA'.rE.

PERMIT LAW OF THE CHICKASAW NATION.

W .A.SHINGTON, D. C., March 13, 1878.
On behalf of the Chickasaw Nation, I have the honor to request
that you will reconsider your decision made on the 27th of ~ugust, 1877,
·
.
respecting the ''permit law" of that nation.
Your conclusion that this law is invalid appears to be based upon
the following grounds :
1. That the government of the Chickasaw Nation possesses no power
of taxation which is not" conferred" by some treaty or statute of the
United States; that no power of taxation has ever been "conferred"
upon the Chickasaw Nation except by article 47 of the treaty of April
28, 1866; and that the conditions precedent and subsequent prescribed
in that treaty have never been complied with.
SIR:
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2. That all persons not by birth, adoption, or otherwise citizens or
members of either the Choctaw or Chickasaw Nations were excepted
from the government and control of the Choctaw and Ohickasaw Nations
by article 7 of the treaty of June 22, 1855.
3. That by article 43 of the treaty of April 28, 1866, the Chickasaw
government is prohibited from expelling persons, not citizens or members of thA nation, who are employed as teachers, mechanics, or agriculturists, except for crime committed; and that the Government of the
United States is not bound by that article to remove such persons.

I.
I respectfu11y submit that if your predecessor, in his letter of April
15, 1876, which virtually constitutes the first of the three grounds above
stated, meant that these nations had no power of taxation which was
not expressly and particularly conferred by treaty or act of Oong1ess,
he mistook the law; but if, on the other hand, be meant that their power
of taxation had not been recognized either particularly and expressly,
or generally and impliedly, by treaty or statute, then he mistook the
facts.
For ninety years the Government of the United States has treated
with the Indian nations, and it has always recognized, not conferred,
their governmental powers. It is possibly true that the administrative
officers of the Government of the United States are authorized to recognize the possession by these nations of only such powers of government
as have been generally, or particularly, expressly, or by implication,
recognized by treaty or by statute. Bat tlle proposition that any of
their governmental powers are actually conferred by, or derived from,
the United States, is inconsistent with all the treaties and with all tue
acts of legislation and judicial decisions growing out of, or relating to,
such treaties.
Of course I do not mean that in these treaties the particular power of
taxation has been singled out and expressly nameu. That is not true
of any of the powers of government. Bat the right of self-government,
in broad and general terms, is recognized. An essential and primary
element of that general power is the particular power of taxation. It
may be true that barbarous nations do not exercise this power; but
then it is also true that they possess it, wllether they exercise it or not.
And it is furthermore true it is not the policy, any more than the right,
of the United States, to compel the Chickasaw Nation to be a barbarous
nation.
From the numerous judicial decisions and treaties, recognizing the
unrestricted right of self-government as inherent in these nations, and
not conferred upon them by the United States, I beg leave to cite the
extracts appended to this communication. If they do not recognize tlle
power of taxation as a part of the general power of these nations, I am
unable to understand what particular power they do so recognize. I
venture to hope that, upon an examination of these treaties and judicial
decisions, you will conclude that your predecessor was mistaken in his
letter of April15, 1876, whether he meant that the Indian nationt; had
no power to tax f'xcept such as was expressly and particularly conferred by treaty or act of Congress, or meant that no such power bad
ever, iu fact, been recognized by treaty or by statute.
Suppose a treaty between the United States and Great Britain to
contain provisions like those contained in the subjoined extract from the
l .ndian treaty. of 1855, in the following words: " The people of Great
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Britain shall be secured in the unrestricted right of self-government
and full jurisdiction over persons and property within their limits," excepting certain persons named. And suppose the Government of the
United tates should claim that by this clause it did not recognize the
power of taxation as a part of the governmental power of Great Britain.
Such a claim would obviously be groundless, not to say preposterous.
But is such a claim any less objectionable in the case of a treaty between the United States and the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nation~
The Supreme Court of the United States, in the opinion appended to
this communication, enunciated the following doctrine:
The words" treaty" and'' nation" are words of our own language, selected in our
diplomatic and legislative proceedins-s by ourselves, having each a definite and wellunderstood meaning. vVe have apphed them to Indians, as we have applied them to
the other nations of the earth. They are applied to all in the same sense. * * *
These articles are associated with others recognizing their title to self-government.
The very fact of repeated treaties with them recognizes it; and the settled doctrine of
the law of nations is that a weaker power does not surrender its independence, its
right to self-government, by associating with a stronger, and taking its protection. A
weak state, in order to provide for its safety, may place itself nuder the protection of
one more powerful, without stripping itself of the right of government and ceasing to
be a state. Examples of this kind are not wanting in Europe. "Tributary and feudatory states,'' says Vattel, "do not thereby cease to be sovereign and independent states
so long as self-government and sovereign and independent autlwrity are left in the
administration of the state." At the present day, more than one state may be considered as holding its right of self-government under the guaranty and protection ot
one or more allies.
In the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of our government we have admitted, by the most solemn sanctions, the existence of the Indians as a separate and
distinct people, and as being vested with rights which constitute them a state or separate community; not a foreign, but a domestic community; not as belonging to the
confederacy, but as exiuting within it, and, of necessity, bearing to it a peculiar relation.

Why, then, should the same words mean any less in a treaty between
tbe United States and the Indian nations than in a treaty between the
United States and European nations~ Is it because the Indians have
not in former times levied taxes like European nations~ Or is the
"unrestricted" self-government of the Indian nations to be restricted
to the methods heretofore employed 1 Is it to be arbitrarily robbed of
the elements and possibilities of progress aud improvement which necessarily belong to all governments¥ If similar clauses in a treaty with
Great Bl'itain would not exclude such changes of system as progress
might bring, why should these clauses in a treaty with the Indian nations have that effect~ There can be but one answer. The unrestricted
right of self-government and full jurisdiction over persons and property
involve the right to make such changes of methods as advancement in
civilization or change of circumstances may suggest. Such is the view
expressed by the court in the same case, in the following words:
The exercise of this independent power surely does not become more objectionable
as it assumes the basis of justice and the forms of civilization. Would it not be a singular argument to admit that, so long as the Indians govern by the rifle and the tomahawk, their government may be tolerated, but that it must be suppressed so soon as it
shall be administered upon the enlightened principles of reason and justice f

If the Chickasaw Nation shall ever adopt such a system of taxation
as is suggested iu article 47 of the treaty of 1866, it will not have derived the power to adopt the system from that article; but will exercise
it as a part of the unrestricted power of self-government inherent in
the nation, and recognized by the United States in numerous treaties,
statutes, and j ndicial decisions.
I hope you may conclude that by the treaties and judicial decisions
cited the United States have recognized the inherent and unrestricted
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right of the Indian nations to govern themselves, and that among the
powers of self-government so held by the Indians is included the power
of taxation. I trust you will not decide that the power of taxation is
to be excluded from the governmental powers of these nations;merely
because it is a power ordinarily exercised by enlightened, and not by
barbarous, nations, but will agree with the Supreme Court that selfgovernment of th~ Indians "does not become more objectionable, as it
assumes the basis of justice and the forms of civilization." I trust that,
if you hold the permit law to be a tax law, you will find no objection to
its validity in the circumstance that the power of taxation bas not been
expressly conferred upon the Chickasaw government by any treaty witbt
or statute of. the Unitod States.
II.
Assuming, then, that the power of taxation is inherent in the Ohicka·
saw Nation, as in other nations; that its existence as an essential portion of the general governmental power of that nation bas been impliedly recognized by the treaties, statutes, and judicial decisions of the
United States for almost one hundred years; and that the want of an
express grant of the power of taxation to the Chickasaw government,
by treaty or act of Congress, does not affect the validity of the permit
law, even though it be regarded as a tax law, I proceed to inquire
whether any objection to the validity of the law is to be found in article
7 of the treaty of 1855. That article stands in the following words:
ART. 7. So far as may be compatible with the Constitution of the United States,
and the laws made in pursuance thereof, regulating trade and intercourse with the
Indian tribes, the Choctaws and Chickasaws shall be secured in the unrestricted 1·ight of
selj-gove1·mnent and full ju1·isdiction over persons and property within their respective
limits; excepting, however, all persons or their property who are not by birth, adO})·
tion, or otherwise, citizens or members of either the Choctaw or Chickasaw tribe, and
· all persons, not being citizens or members of either tribe, found within their limits,
shall be considered intruders, and be removed from and kept out of the same by the
United States agent, assisted, if necessary, by the military, with the following exceptions, viz: Such individuals as are now, or may b.e, in the employment of the government, and their famili('S; those peacefully traveling or temporarily sqjourning in the
country, or trading therein under license from the proper authority of the United
States, and such as may be permitted by the Choctaws .and Chickasaws, with the
assent of the United States agent, to reside within their limits, without becoming
citizens or members of either of said tribes. (11 Stats., 612, 613.)

I concede that, notwithstanding their possession of the power of taxation, as a part of their general power of self-government, if this treaty
stipulation deprived them of the right to enact the particular statute
known as the permit law, they are bound by the agreement, and the permit law, whether it is or is not a tax law, must be held null and void.
But it seems to me that there is no repugnancy between this stipulation of the treaty and the permit law. That part of article 7 which
precedes the exception is a renewed recognition of inherent rights
which the United ~tates bad often recognized before, but never, either at
the making of this treaty or at any other time, pretended to confer upon
the Choctaw and Chickasaw nations. The exception itself is a limitation of these rights, which limitation could only be made by treaty.
And what~ver is not by the exception clearly taken out of the general
power recognized by the preceding clause must remain a part of that
power.
.
If the effect of the exception were to stipulate that the Choctaw and
Chickasaw nations should have no jurisdiction whatever over persons
not citizens or members of the tribes, I do not see bow it could impair
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the right of the Cllickasaw legislature to enact the permit law. The
provision 9f that law is that no citizen of a State or Territory shall reside in the Chickasaw Nation as an employe of a Chickasaw without an
annual permit from the Chickasaw government, for which the sum of
$25 is payable in each case. The enforcement of this law does not seem
to me to be an exercise of any jurisdiction in any such sense as that in
which the word jurisdiction is used in the treaty, or in which it is ordinarily used. It would not seem to be an exercise of jurisdiction in any
such sense, or in any just sense, over subjects of the empire of China,
to forbid their entry into the United States without permits from your
government. It would not be an exercise of jurisdiction over a Britisll
subject to compel him to pay the ordinary import duty on his property,
and tonnage tax upon his ship, on landing in the United States.
Foreign sovereigns and their ambassadors are exempt from the jurisdiction of your government. Is it an exercise of jurisdiction over au
ambassador to compel him, as a condition of residence in your country,
to observe the rules imposed upon ambassadors by the law of nations '?
Would it be an exercise of such jurisdiction for the sergeant-at-arms of
the Senate or House of Representatives to remove an ambassador from
the House or Senate for disorderly behavior~ When Mr. Justice Miller
repressed disoruerly conduct on the part of Dom Pedro, in the Supreme
Court, was there an exercise of jurisdiction over the Emperor of Brazil r
If, then, the enforcement of the permit law can, in any sense, be called
the exercise of any jurisdiction whatever, it does not seem to be the exercise of any jurisdiction which may be fairly said to be comprehended
within the meaning of the term used in the treaty.
But, then, the effect of the exception in article 7 is not to stipulate
that the Indian governments shall have no jurisdiction whateYer oYer
persons not citizens or members of their tribes. The stipulation is that
the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations shall not have full jurisdiction over
persons not citizens, or members of their tribes. The enactment of the
permit law doPs not seem to me to involve an exercise of the full jurisdiction prohibited by this treaty. It certainly is not in itself an exercise of fulljurisdiceion over all persons concerned. Nor is it iu fact accompanied or followed by the exercise of full jurisdiction oYer these
persons.
If it is an assertion of jurisdiction, in any sense or to any extent, it
certainly is not an assertion of full jurisdiction to compel a foreign ambassador, as a condition of the use of your mails, to procure a permit in
the form of a postage-stamp; or to require him, as a condition of remaining in your country, to obserye the rules imposed upon ambassadors by the Jaw of nations; or to compel him, as a condition of entering
the halls of your supreme legislature or Supreme Court, to observe the
rules imposed upon visitors by those bodies. Is it any more an assertion of full jurisdiction over white persons by the Chickasaw Nation to
compel them, as a condition of entering the Territory, to procure a permit from the Chickasaw Government~
The persons in question are not obliged to enter the Chickasaw Nation.
They can remain without, and so avoid the necessity of obtaining the
permits. Nor is there any obligation resting on the Indian government
to admit persons who desire to be employed by individual Indians, or
whom individual Indians desire to employ. Nowhere in the treaties can
any clause be found imposing any such obligation. And this brings me
to the third ground on which your decision rests.
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III.
I respectfully submit that no obligation to admit such persons Is Ill·
posed by article 43 of the treaty of 1866. That article is framed in the
following words:
ART. 43. The United States pr01nise and agree that no white person, except officers,
agents, and employes of the government, and of any internal improvement company,
or persons traveling through, or temporarily sojourning in, the said nations, or either of
them, shall be permitted to go into saicl Ten··itory, unless formally incorporated and naturalized, by the joint action of the authorities of both nations, into one of the said nations
of Choctaws and Chickasaws, according to their laws, customs, or usages; but this
article is not to be construed to affect parties heretofore adopted, or to p1·event the employment temporarily of white persons, who are teachers, mechanics, or skilled in agriculture, or to prevent the legislative authorities of the respective nations from authorizing such works of internal improvement as they may deem essential to the welfare
and prosperiliy of the community, or be taken to interfere with or invalidate any
action which has heretofore been had, in this connection, by either of the said nations.

I submit that this article does not prohibit the expulsion by the
Chickasaw government of white persons employed as teachers, mechanics, or agriculturists by individual Indians. The article does not touch
upon the duty of the Chickasaws to receive such persons, or their power
to remove them. It merely pledges the United States to prevent the
entrance of white persons into the Territory, with certain indicated exceptions, and declares that the obligation so assurrted by the United States
shall not "prevent the employment temporarily of white persons who are
teachers, mechanics, or skilled in agriculture." It nowhere provides,
nor purports to provide, that such persons shall be admitted. What it
does provide is that its own stipulation shall not exclude such persons.
It neither binds the United States to remove them, nor forbids the Indians to exclude them. It leaves the question of their admission or
exclusion to the operation of other rules or laws.
To be sure, this article does not confer upon the Chickasaw Nation
the power to enact a permit law, or to exclude those who seek to enter
the Territory in defiance of its provisions. But that is not the question.
The question is whether it prohibits the enactment of such a law or the
exclusion of such persons by the Chickasaw government. And that it
does not purport to do. If, then, they had this power before, and independently of, the treaty of 1866, it was not taken away by that treaty.
That they bad the power to prevent the entry of white teachers, mechanics, and agriculturists, and to forbid or regulate their employment,
before the treaty of 1866, is very clear ; indeed, before the treaty of
1866, such persons were interdicted persons in the Chickasaw country.
They fell within the class declared "intruders" in article 7 of the treaty
of 1855. The Government of the United States was itself, by the terms
of that article, bound to remove them, unless they were permitted to
remain by the Choctaw and Chickasaw governments, with the consent
of the United States Indian agent. And as there is nothing in article
43 of the treaty of 1866 to compel the Chickasaws to admit such persons, so is there nothing of the kind in article 7 of the treaty of 1855,
or in any other treaty.
In article 7 of the treaty of 1855, the United States promise to remove certain intruders. From this class of "intruders'' there is, in
that article, no exception of persons employed as teachers, mechanics,
{)r farmers, by individual Indians, unless such persons are permitted by
the Indian governments, with the consent of the United States Indian
agent, to reside in the nation. In article 43 of the treaty of 1866, the
United States do not, according to your construction of. that article,
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promise to remove those whites who are employed as teachers, mechanics, or farmers, by individual Indians, even though they are so employed
in disregard of the authority of the Indian go\ernments. Now, it seems
to be assumed that because the United States in the first case did p1·mn-ise to remove these people, therefore the Chickasaws were divested of
their own right to do that; and in the latter case that because the
United States did not promise to remove them, therefore the Chickasaws
were divested of their right to remove them. Evidently these assumptions cannot both be correct. I t,hink they are both erroneous. I think
that the promise, or want of a promise, on the part of the United States
to remove these persons involves no implied prohibition of their removal
by the Chickasaws themselves.
I think the Government of the United States would be slow to concede that an arrangement hy which it should undertake to capture and
punish cattle-thieves in Mexico would, by implication, exempt Mexico
from the obligation to capture and punish those offenders; as certainly
l\lexico would be slow to concede that she was by such treaty deprived
of her right to capture and punish them.
I am equally at a Joss to see how a promise by the Cnited States to
exclude or remove offenders from the Chickasaw Nation could deprive
the Chickasaw government of the right to do it. Nor is it any easier
for me to see how a want of a promiee of this kind on the part of the
United States could deprive the Chickasaw Nation of its rights in the
premises.
It is not a case in which the maxim that the specification of one thing
excludes another bas any applicability. It would be as reasonable to
invoke that maxim to show that a promise, on the part of one government, to desist from piracy, or slave-trading, bound another government
to persist therein; or that a treaty stipulation, binding China to restrict
her emigration to the United States, excluded the exercise of the power
of self-protection in that regard by the United States.
There are certain considerations which render a re-examination of
your decision of the highest importance to the Chickasaws and other
Indian nations. Those nations, on account of their geographical
position and the value of their lands and mines, are exposed to the
machinations of swarms of covetous whites, who are as fertile in
resources as they are unprincipled in character. It would be difficult
for. a government of the most enlightened white men to sustain
itself if it were embarrassed by the presence of a horde of such men
within its territorial limits, over whom it could exercise no jurisdiction.
To these Indian governments the perplexities and difficulties which
result from the license afforded to bad men by your decision will be
well-nigh intolerable. There are already in our midst many persons
who are in league with our greedy enemies to ruin our governments;
and with the connivance of these persons swarms of so·called !aborers
will invade our country, to defy our laws, and bring misfortune and
misery upon our people and disgrace upon our government. The people
of the United States, when they reproach us for permitting our country
to become an asylum for outcasts, and our government to become turbulent, disorderly, and weak, may forget that it is the Government of
the United States which compels our country to become and remain the
asylum for their scoundrels, and deprives us of the power of governing
them while they live in our midst.
· Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
B. F. OVERTON,
Gm,ernor Chickasaw Nation.
Ron. CARL SCHURZ,
Secretary of the Interior.
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[Ext1'acts front judicial decisions and i1·eaties.]
Worcester t'. The State of Georgia, 6 Pet., 556.-0pinion by Chief Justice Marshall:
This treaty, thus explicitly recognizing the national character of the Cherokees and
their right of self-government; thus guaranteeing their lands, assuming the duty of
protection, and of course pledging the faith of the United States for that protection,
has been frequently renewed, and is now in full force. (p. 556.)
All these acts, and especially that of 1802, which is still in force, masifestly consider
the several Indian nations as distinct political communities, having territorial boundaries within which their authority is exclusive, aud having a right to all the lands
within those boundaries, which is not only acknowledged, but guaranteed by the
United States. (p. 557.)
The Indian .nations had always been considered as distinct, independent political
communities, retaining their original natural rights, as the undisputed possessors of
the soil, from time immemorial, with the single exception of that imposed by irresistible power, which excluded them from intercourse with any other European potentate than the first discoverer of the coast of the particular region claimed; and this
was a restriction which thoge European potentates imposed on them~elves as well as
on the Indians. The very term nation, so generally applied to them, means a people
distinct from others. The Constitution, by declaring treaties already made, as well as
those to be made, the supreme law of the land, has adopted and sanctioned the previous tr:eaties with the Indian nations, and consequently admits their rank among
t.hose powers who are capable of making treatie!'l. The words'' treaty" and" nation"
are words of our own language, selected in our diplomatic and legislative proceedings,
by ourselves, having each a definite and well-understood meaning. We have applied
them to Indians, as we have applied them to the other nations of the earth. They are
applied to all in the same sense. (pp. 559, 560.)
In opposition to this original right, possessed by the undisputed occupants of every
country, to this recognition of that right, which is evidenced by our history, in every
change through which we have passed, is placed the charters granted by the monarch
of a distant and distinct region, parceling out a territory in possession of others whom
he could not remove, and did not attempt to remove, and the cession made of his
claims made by the treaty of peace.
The actual state of things at the time, and all history since, explain these charters;
and the King of Great Britain, at the treaty of peace, could cede only what belonged
to his crown. These newly-asserted titles cau derive no aid from the articles so often
repeated in Indian treaties, extending to them, first, the protection of Great Britain,
and afterwards that of the United States. '£hese articles are associated with others
recognizing their title to self-government. The very fact of repeated treaties with
them recognizes it, and the settled doctrine of the law of nations, that a weaker power
does not surrender its independence-its right to self-government-by associating with
a stronger and ta,king its protection. A weak state, in order to provide for its safety,
may place itself under the protection of one more powerful, without stripping itself of
the right of government and ceasing to be a state. Examples of this kind are not
wanting in Europe. "Tributary and feudatory states," says Vattel, "do not thereby
cease to be sovereign and independent states so long as self-government and sovereign
and independent authority are left in the administration of the state." At the present
day, more than one state may be considered as holding its rights of self-government
under the guarantees and protection of one or more allies.
The Cherokee Nation, then, is a distinct community, occupying its own territory,
with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no force,
and which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter, but with the assent of the
Cherokees themselves, or in conformity with treaties and with the acts of Congress.
The whole intercourse between the United States and this nation is, by our Constitution and laws, vested in the Government of the United States. (pp. 560, 561.)
It must be admitted that the Indians sustain a peculiar relation to the United States.
They do not constitute, as was decided at the last term, a foreign state, so as to claim
the right to sue in the Supreme Court of the United States; and yet, having the right
of self-government, they, in some sense, form a state. In the management of their
internal concerns they are dependent on no power. They pnnish offenses under their
own laws, and, in doing so, they are responsible to no earthly tribunal. They make
war and form treaties of peace. The exercise of these and other powers gives to them
a distinct character as a 1)eople, and constitutes them, in some respects, a state,
although they may not be admitted to possess the right of soil. (p. 581.)
'
The language used in treaties with the Indians should never be construed to their
prejudice. If words be made use of which are susceptible of a more extended meaning
than their plain import, as connected with the tenor of the treaty, they should l>e considered as used only in the latter sense. To contend that the word ''allotted," in reference to the land guaranteed to the Indians in certain treaties, indicates a favor conferred, rather than a right acknowledged, would, it would seem to me, do injustice to
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the understanding of the parties. How the words of the treaty were understood by
this unlettered people, rather than their critical meaning, should form the rule of construction. ( p. 5!:!2.)
By numerous treaties with the Indian tribes, we have acquired accessions of territory
of incalculable value to the Union. Except by compact, we have not even claimed a
right of way through the Indian lands. We have recognized in them the right to make
war. No one has ever supposed that the Indians could commit treason against the
United States. \Ve have l)Unished them for their violation of treaties, but we have
inflicted the punishment on them as a nation, and not on individual offenders among
them as traitors.
In the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of our government, we have admitted, by the most solemn sanctions, the exiRtence of the Indians as a separate and
distinct people and as being vested with rights which constitute them a state or separate community-not a foreign, but a domestic community-not as belonging to the
confederacy, but as existing within it, and, of necessity, bearing to it a peculiar relation. (p. 583.)
Much bas been said against the existence of an independent power within a sovereign
state; and the conclusion has been drawn that the Indians, as a matter of right, cannot enforce their own laws within the territorial limits of a State. The refutation of
this argument is found in our past history. That fragments of tribes, having lost the
power of self-government, and who lived within the ordin:lry jurisdiction of a State,
have been taken under the protection of the laws, has already been admitted. But
there has been no instance where the State laws have been generally extended over a
numerous tribe of Indians, living within the State, and exercising the right of selfgovernment, until recently.
The exercise of this independent power surely does not become more objectionable
as it assumes the ba8is of justice and the forms of civilization. Would it not be a
singular argument to admit that, so long as the Indians govern by the rifle and the
tomahawk, their government may be tolerated, but that it must be suppressed as soon
as it shall be administered upon the enlightened principles of reason and justice'?
Are not those nations of Indians who have made some advances in civilization bet ..
ter neighbors than thode wbo are still in a savage state'? And is not the principle as
to their self-government, within the jurisdiction. of a State, the same. (pp. 589, 590) '?
The residence of Indians, governed by their own laws, within the limits of a State,
bas never been deemed incompatible with State sovereignty until recently. And yet,
this has been the condition of many distinct tribes of Inuians since the foundation of
the Federal Government. (p. 591.)
It has been shown that the treaties and laws referred to come within the due exercise of the constitutional powers of the Federal Government; that they remain in full
force, and , consequently, must be considered as the supreme laws of the land. These
laws throw a shield over the Cherokee Indians. They guaranteed to them their rights
of occupancy, of self-government, and the full enjoyment of those blessings which might
be attained in their humble condition. But, by the enactments of the State of Georgia,
this shield is broken in pieces, the infant institutions of the Cherokees are abolished,
and their laws annulled. Infamous punishment is denounced against them for the
exercise of those rights which have been most solemnly guaranteed to them by the national faith. ( p. 595.)
Indian tribes are states, in a certain sense, though not foreign states or States of the
United States, within the meaning of the second section of the third article of the Constitution , which extends the judicial power to controversies between two or more States,
between a State and citizens of another State, between citizens of different States, and
between a State or the citizens thereof and foreign states, citizens, or subjects. 1.'hey
are not states within the meaning of any one of those clauses of the Constitution, ancl
yet, in a certain domestic sense, and for certain municipal purposes, they are states, and
have been uniformly so treated since the settlement of our country and throughout
its history, and numerous treaties made with them recognize them as a people capable
of maintaining the relations of peace and war, of being responsible, in their political
character, for any violation of their engagements, or for any aggression committed on
the citizens of the United States by any individual of their community. Laws have
been enacted by Congress in the spirit of those treaties, and the acts of our government,
both in the executive and legislative departments, plainly recognize such tribes or nations as states, and the courts of the United States are bound hy those acts. (Holden r.
Joy, 17 Wallace, 242.)
TREATY WITH TilE DELAWARES, SEPTEl\IBEH.

17, 1778.

ARTICLE 2. That a perpetnal peace and friendship shall from henceforth take place
and subsist between the contracting parties aforesaid through all succeeding generations; and if either of the parties are engaged in a just and necessary war with any
other nation or nations, that then each shall assist the other in due proportion to their
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abilities, till their enemies are brought to reasonable terms of accommodation; and
that; if either of them shall discover any hostile designs forming against the other, they
shall give the earliest notice thereof, that timeous measures may be taken to prevent
their ill effect. (7 U.S. Stats., 13.)
TREATY WITII TilE WYANDOTS 1 JANUARY 21, 1785.
ARTICLE 5. If any citizen of the United States, or other person not being an Indian,
shall attempt to settle on any of the lands allotted to the Wyandot and Delaware na·
tions in this treaty, except on the lands reserved to the United States in the preceding
article, such person shall forfeit the protection of the United States, and the Indians
may punish .him as they please. (7 U.S. Stats., p.17.)
TREATY ''i'ITH THE CHEROKEES, NOVEMBER 28, 1785.
ARTICLE 5. If any citizen of the United States, or other person not being an Indian,
shall attempt to settle on any of the lands westward or southward of the said boundary, which are hereby allotted to the Indians for their hunting-grounds, or having already settled, and will not remove from the same within six months after tbe mtification of this treaty, such person shall forfeit the protection of the United States, and the
Indians may punish them or not as they please : P1·ovided, nevet·theless, That this article
shall not extend to the people settled between the fork of French Broad and Holstein
rivers, whose particular situation shall be transmitted to the United States in Congress
assembled for their decision thereon, which the Indians agree to abide by. (7 U.S.
Stats., 19.)
TREATY WITH THE vVYANDOTS1 JANUARY 19, 1789.
ARTICLE 9. If any person or persons, citizens or subjects of the United States, or any
other person not being an Indian, shall presume to settle upon 'the lands confirmed to
the said nations, he and they shall be ont of the protection of the United States, and
tile said nations may punish him or them in such manner as they see fit. (7 U.S.
Stats. , 30.)
TREATY WITII THE CREEKS, AUGUST 7, 1790.
ARTICLE 6. If any citizen of the United States, or other person not being an Indian,
shall attempt to settle on any of the Creeks' lands, such person shall forfeit the protection of the United States, and the Creeks may punish him or not, as they please. (i
U.S. Stats., 36.)
TREATY WITH THE CHEROKEES, JULY 2, 1791.
ARTICI.E 8. If any citizen of the United States, or other person not being an Indian,
shall settle on any of the Cherokees' lands, such person shall forfeit the protection of
the United States, and the Cherokees may punish him or not, as they please. (7 U.S.
Stats., 40.)
·
TREATY WITH THE WYANDOTS 1 ETC., AUGUST 3 1 1795.
ARTICLE 6. If any citizen of the United States, or other white person or persons,
shall presume to settle upon the lands now relinquished by the United States, such
citizen or other per6on shall be out of the protection of the United States; and the Indian tribe on whose land the settlement shall be made may drive off the settler, or
punish him in such manner as they shall think fit; and, because such settlements,
made without the consent of the United States, will be injurious to them, as well as
to the Indians, the United States shall be at liberty to break them np and remove and
punish the settlers, as they shall think proper, and so effect that protection of the Indian lands hereinbefore stipulated. (7 U.S. Stats., G2.)
THEATY WITH THE CIIOCTAWS 1 SEPfEl\IBER

~7,

1830.

ARTICLE 4. The government and people of the United States are hereby obliged to
secure to the said Choctaw Nation of red people the jurisdiction and government of all
the persons and property that may be within their limits west, so that no Territory or
State shall ever have a right' to pass laws for the government of the Choctaw Nation
of red people and their descendants, and that no part of the land granted them shall
ever be embraced in any Territory or State; but the United States shall forever secure
said Choctaw Nation from and against all laws, except such as from time to time may
be enacted in their own national councils, not inconsistent with the Constitution,
treaties, and laws of the United States, and except such as may and which have been
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enacted uy Congress to the extent that Congress, under the Constitution, are required
to exercise a legislation over Indian affairs. (7 U.S. Stats., pp. 333, 334.)
SAl\IE TREATY.
ARTICLE 5. The United States hereby covenant and agree that the lands ceded to
the Cherokee Nation in the foregoing article shall in no future time, without their
consent, be included within the territorial limits or jurisdiction of any State or Ter·
ritory; but they shall secure to the Cherokee Nation the right, by their national coun·
cils, to make and carry into effect all such laws as they may deem necessary for the
government and protection of the persons and property within their own country1
belonging to their people, or such persons as have connected themselves with them:
P1·ovided, always, That they shall not be inconsistent with the Constitution of the
United States, and such acts of Congress as have been or may be passed regulating
trade and intercourse with the Indians; and also, that they shall not be considered as
extending to such citizens and Army of the United States as may travel or reside in
the Intlian country, by permission, according to the laws and regulations established
by the government of the same. (7 U.S. Stats., 481.)
TREATY WITH THE CREEKS AND SEMINOLES, JANUARY 4, 1845.
ARTICLE 1. The Creeks agree that the Seminoles shall be entitled to settle in a body,
or separately, as they please, in any part of the Creek country; that they shall make
their own town regulations, subject, however, to the general control of the Creek council, in which they shall be represented; and, in short, that no distinction shall ba
made between the two tribes in any respect, except in the management of their pecuniary affairs, in which neithe.r shall interfere with the other. (9 U. S. Stats., 821.)
TREATY WITH TilE CHEROKEES, AUGUST 6, 1846.
ARTICLE 2. No one shall be punished for any crime or misdemeanor except on convic.
tion by a jury of his country, and the sentence of a court duly authorized by law to
take cognizance of the offense. -And it is further agreed all fugitives from justice, except those included in the general amnesty herein stipulated, seeking refuge in t.be
Territory of the United States, shall be delivered up by the authorities of the United
States to the Cherokee Nation for trial and punishment. (9 U.S. Stats., 872.)
TREATY WITII THE CHOCTAWS AND CHICKASAWS, JUNE 22, 1855.
ARTICLE 4. The government and laws now in operation, and not incompatible with
t.his instrument, shall be and remain in full force and effect within the limits of the
Chickasaw district until the Chickasaws shall adopt a constitution and enact laws
superseding, abrogating, or changing the same. And all judicial proceedings within
said district, commenced 11rior to the adoption of a constitution and laws by the
Chickasaws, shall be conducted and determined according to existing laws.
ARTICLE 7. So far as may be compatible with the Constitution of the United States
and the laws made in pursuance thereof, regulating trade and intercourse with the
Indian tribes, the Choctaws and Chickasaws shall be secured in the unrestricted right
of self-government and full jurisdiction over persons aud property within their respective limits, excepting, however, all persons with their property who are not by
birth, adoption, or otherwise citizens or members of either the Choctaw or Chickasaw
tribes, and all persons, not being citizens or memuers of either tribe, found within
their limits shall be considered intruders, and be removed from and kept out of
the same by the United States agent (assisted, if necessary, by the military),
with the following exceptions, viz: Such individuals as are now or may be in the
-employment of the government, and their famiiies; those peacefully traveling or temporarily sojourning in the country, or trading therein under license from the proper
authority of the United States; and such as may be permitted by the Choctaws or
Chickasaws, with the assent of the United States agent, to reside within their limits
without becoming citizens or members of either of said tribes. (11 U. S. Stats., 612,
613.)

TREATY WITH THR CREEKS AND SEMINOLES, AUGUST 7, 1856.
ARTICLE 15. So far as may be compatible with the Constitution of the United States,
and the laws made in pursuance thereof, regulating tra e and intercourse with the Indian tribes, the Creeks and Seminoles shall be secured in the unrestricted right of
self-~overnment, and full jurisdiction over persons and property within their respect·
i ve limits; excepting, however, all white persons, with their property,who are not, by
.adoption or otherwise, members of either the Creek or Seminole tribe; and all persons
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not being members of either tribe, found wit.bin their limits, shall be considered intruders1 and be removed from and kept out of the same by the United States agents
for said tribes, respectively (assisted, if necessary, by the military), with the following exceptions, viz : Such individuals, with their families, as may be in the employment of the Government of the United States; all persons peaceably traveling or
temporarily sojourning in the country, or trading therein under license from the proper
authority of th~ United States; and such persons as may be permitted by the Creeks
or Seminoles, with the assent of the proper authorities of the United States, to reside
within their respective limits, without becoming members of either o~ said tribes.
ARTICLE 25. 'l'he Creek laws shall be in force and continue to operate in the country
herein assigned to the Seminoles, until the latter remove thereto, when they shall
cease and be of no effect. (11 U. S. Stats., 703, 704, 'i05.)
TREATY WITH THE SEMINOLES, MARCH 21, 1866.
ARTICLE 7. T!le Seminole Nation agrees to such legislation as Congress and the President may deem necessary for the better administration of the rights of person and
property within the Indian Territory: Provided, hmveve1·, That said legislation shall
not in any manner interfere with or annul their present tribal organization, rights,
laws, privileges, and customs. (14 U.S. Stats., 7t8.)
TREATY WITH TilE CHOCTAWS .AND CHICKASAWS, APRIL 28, 1866.
ARTICKE 7. The Choctaws and Chickasaws agree to such legislation as Congress and
the President of the ·u nited States may deem necessary for the better administration of
justice and the protection of the rights of person and property within the Indian Territory: Pt·ovided, however, Such legislation shall not in anywise interfere with or annul
their present tribal organization, or their respect.ivc legislatures or judiciaries, or the
rights, laws, privileges, or customs of the Chcctaw and Chickasaw Nations respectively. (14 U.S. Stats., 771.)
ARTICLE 38. Every white person who, having married a Choctaw or Chickasaw, resides
in the said Choctaw or Chickasaw nation, or who has been adopted by the legislative
authorities, is to be deemed a member of said nation, and shall be subject to the laws
of the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations, according to his domicile~ and to prosecution
and trial before their tribunals, and to punishment according to their laws, in all respects as though be was a native Choctaw or Chickasaw.
ARTILLB 45. All the rights, privileges, and immunities heretofore possessed by said nations, or individuals thereof, or to which they were entitled under the treaties and legislation theretofore made and bad in connection with them, shall be, and are hereby, declared to be in full force, so far as they are consistent with the provisions of this treaty.
(14 U.S. Stats., 779, 780.)
THEATY WITH TilE CREEK8, JUNE 14, 1865.
ARTICLE 10. The Creeks agree to such legislation as Congress and the President of
the United States may deem necessary for the better administration of justice, and the
protection of the rights of person and property within the Indian Territory: Pro1'i ded, hmcever, That said legislation shall not in any manner interfere with or annul
their preEent tribal organization, rights, laws, privilege~;, and customs. (14 U.S. Stats.,
788.)
TR:I!:ATY WIT a THE ( HEROKEES 1 JULY 19, 1866.
ARTJCJ,E 5. The inhabitants electing to reside in the district described in the preceding article, shall have the right to elect all their local officers and judges, and the number
of delegates, to which, by their numbers, they may be entitled in any general council,
to be established in the Indian Territory under the provisions of this treaty, as stated
in article 12; -and to control all their local affairs, and to establish all necessary police
regulations and rules for the administration of justice in said district not inconsistent
with the constitution of the Cherokee Nation or the laws of the United States: Provided, The Cherokees residing in said district shall enjoy all the rights and privileges of
other Cherokees who may elect to settle in said district, as hereinbefore provided, and
shall hold the same rights and privileges, aud be subject to the same liabilitie&, as
those who elect to settle in said district under the provisions of this treaty: Provided, also, '!'hat if any such police regulations or rules lJe adopted which, in the opinion oi the President, bear oppressively on any citizen of the nation, he maytmspend the
same. And all rules and regulations in said dtstrict, or in any other district of the
nation, discrim;nating against thA citizens of other districts, are prohibited, and shall
be v.>id. (14 U.S. Stats., 800, 801.)
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